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Abstract: 
The reality of human experience is that ‗housing‘ – which usually connotes the 
practical provision of a roof over one‘s head – is experienced by users as ‗home‘ - 
broadly described as housing plus the experiential elements of dwelling.  Conversely, 
the condition of being without housing, commonly described as ‗homelessness‘, is 
experienced not only as an absence of shelter but in the philosophical sense of 
‗ontological homelessness‘ and alienation from the conditions for well-being: the 
practical and psychological benefits that flow from having an opportunity to establish 
a home.  For asylum seekers, these experiences are deliberately and explicitly 
excluded from official law and policy discourses.  This article demonstrates how, in 
the case of asylum seekers, law and policy is propelled by an ‗official discourse‘ 
based on the denial of housing and the avoidance of ‗home‘ attachments, which 
effectively keeps the asylum seeker in a state of ontological homelessness and 
alienation.  We reflect on how considerations of housing and home are excluded from 
policy debates and even legal analyses concerning asylum seekers, and consider how 
a new ‗oppositional discourse‘ of housing and home – which allowed these 
considerations to be taken into account – might impact on the balancing exercise 
inherent to laws and policies concerning asylum seekers.       
  
                                                 
 Durham Law School, 50 North Bailey, Durham, England, DH1 3ET; lorna.fox@durham.ac.uk; 
j.a.sweeney@durham.ac.uk.  We are grateful to the Institute of Advanced Study at Durham University, 
whose generous support facilitated the research project on which this article is based, and to David 
O‘Mahony who provided helpful comments on an earlier draft.  
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The exclusion of (failed) asylum seekers from housing and home: towards an 
oppositional discourse 
 
Lorna Fox O’Mahony & James A. Sweeney 
 
Introduction  
 
The reality of the human experience is that ‗housing‘ – however it is defined and 
whether it is, as a question of fact, more or less satisfactory – is experienced by users 
as ‗home‘.  While ‗housing‘ usually connotes the practical provision of a roof over 
one‘s head, ‗home‘ can be broadly described as housing plus the experiential elements 
of home – as a valued territory, as signifier and constituent of self- and social-identity, 
and as a social and cultural environment that is appropriate for the user‘s needs and 
way of life, for example, suitable for family life, and by providing an opportunity to 
participate in a community/society.
1
  Consequently, the condition of being without 
housing, commonly described as ‗homelessness‘ is experienced not only as the 
absence of shelter (houselessness) but as alienation, both in the philosophical sense of 
ontological homelessness
2
 and alienation from the conditions for well-being 
(homelessness).
3
  This article focuses on (failed) asylum seekers – that is, those who 
are awaiting determination of their claim for asylum and those whose claims have 
been refused but who have not yet left the UK - who we describe as ‗doubly 
displaced‘, at the state level and, often, at the level of dwelling-place: displaced from 
their home state and dispossessed from their homes within that state, and prevented 
from re-establishing their sense of place in the host state, including – in light of their 
precarious claim on housing – being unable to secure the use of a dwelling which they 
can establish as a home.  Starting from the (failed) asylum seeker‘s human experience 
of ‗double displacement‘, we consider legal and policy responses to the housing of 
asylum seekers, to reflect on the exclusion of considerations of housing and home 
from policy debates and legal analyses concerning asylum seekers.   
 
In doing so, we draw upon the recent emergence of ‗home‘ as a subject of legal 
analysis,
4
 and particularly on the proposition that the occupied home is a distinct type 
of property, based on its central role in our lived experiences as humans.
5
  A key 
feature of our approach is our emphasis on the displaced or dispossessed human 
person who is the subject of the discussion.  Our analysis is consciously shaped 
through the lens of the human experience of double displacement, rather than being 
framed by the current UK regulatory framework: that is, our analysis starts from the 
                                                 
1
 On home as ‗house + x‘ and the elements of the ‗x factor‘ interest, see L Fox, Conceptualising Home: 
Theories, Laws and Policies (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006), especially Chapter Four. 
2
 Giddens described ‗ontological security‘ as: ―a person‘s fundamental sense of safety in the world and 
includes a basic trust of other people. Obtaining such trust becomes necessary in order for a person to 
maintain a sense of psychological well-being and avoid existential anxiety‖; A Giddens, Modernity and 
self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age (Cambridge, Polity, 1991), 38–39.   
3
 On the distinctions between ‗houselessness‘ and ‗homelessness‘ see P Somerville, ―Homelessness and 
the Meaning of Home: Rooflessness or Rootlessness?‖ (1992) 16 International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 529.  
4
 See, for example, Fox, op cit, n 1; DB Barros, ―Home as a Legal Concept‖ (2006) 46 Santa Clara Law 
Review 255; M J Ballard, ―Legal Protections for Home Dwellers: Caulking the Cracks to Preserve 
Occupancy‖ (2006) 56 Syracuse Law Review 277. 
5
 The legal concept of home is built on empirical studies and theoretical analyses of the lived 
experience of home, the meanings which home represents for occupiers, and the experience of losing 
one‘s home; see generally Fox, op cit n 1, especially Chapter Four.  
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person, rather than the law.  Since the human experience of double displacement is 
not mitigated or exacerbated by legal changes in a person‘s immigration status our 
analysis considers both asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers (although we 
recognise that the underlying policy arguments about the provision of social housing 
may differ).
6
  
 
This approach has roots in the epistemological tradition of social constructionism,
7
 
and particularly in the construction of social problems and policy narratives: ―…on 
shifting sands of public rhetoric, coalition building, interest group lobbying and 
political expediency.‖8  This perspective – which recognises the ‗implicitly and 
intentionally rhetorical‘ process of defining housing problems for the purposes of 
policy debate – allows us to explore not only the material impact of exclusion from 
housing and home for (failed) asylum seekers, but the process by which the impact of 
this exclusion is in turn excluded from the policy process as not being a problem 
which should be acted upon.  We start from a focus on the experiences of asylum 
seekers, and the (often deliberate) exclusion of these experiences from the policy 
process, and reflect on the implications this has for the ways in which issues 
concerning housing and home for asylum seekers are formulated, debated and 
critiqued in law and policy.  Our critique posits that the development of law and 
policy in this context has been dominated by an ‗official discourse‘ in respect of 
asylum seekers, which emphasises the government‘s objectives of reducing alleged 
‗pull factors‘, discouraging the formation of ‗home‘ attachments or affiliative bonds 
in the UK, and incentivising voluntary return, as well as focusing asylum policy on 
the overarching objective of securing the UK‘s borders. 
 
While decisions as to entry into the UK are properly recognised in international law as 
an expression of state sovereignty,
9
 this state right is subject to, and must be balanced 
against, the individual right to seek refuge, which marks an exception to the state‘s 
absolute sovereignty in this regard.
10
  Although the UN Refugee Convention provides 
the international legal definition of a refugee, it does not specify a process for 
determining who meets the definition.
11
  It is in this determination of the scope and 
                                                 
6
 See J Sweeney, ―The Human Rights of Failed Asylum Seekers in the UK‖ (2008) Public Law 277 
7
 See PL Berger & T Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge (New York, Anchor Books, 1967); for discussion of the use of social constructionism in 
housing research, see K Jacobs, J Kemeny & T Manzi (eds), Social Constructionism in Housing 
Research (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004).   
8
 Jacobs et al, id., p5.   
9
 ―One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the right to refuse to permit an 
alien to enter that State, to annex what conditions it pleases to the permission to enter it and to expel or 
deport from the State at pleasure, even a friendly alien, especially if it considers his presence in the 
State opposed to its peace, order, and good government, or to its social or material interests: E de 
Vattel, Law of Nations, book 1, s. 231; book 2, s.125.‖; A-G for the Dominion of Canada v Cain 
[1906] AC 542 at 546 per Lord Atkinson.   
10
 While state nationals have the right to enter the territory of the state, non-nationals have only limited 
rights of entry, established in international and domestic laws to varying degrees, for example, the right 
of an asylum seeker to seek refuge from a well-founded fear of persecution, under Article 14 of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.   
  
11
 The recognition of refugee status and the granting of asylum in the UK has traditionally been at the 
discretion of the executive, in the form of the Home Secretary, with a limited role for judicial 
oversight: see G Clayton, Textbook on Immigration and Asylum (2
nd
 edn, Oxford, OUP, 2006); G 
Care, ―The Judiciary, The State and The Refugee: The Evolution of Judicial Protection in Asylum – A 
UK Perspective‖ (2005) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1421.  In the exercise of this discretion, 
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extent of the state‘s discretion that domestic law and policy must weigh the balance 
between state rights and individual rights.  This article argues that the power of 
official discourse – for example, in relation to national and individual security - 
threatens to obfuscate the nature and extent of the competing interests at stake.  The 
problem, we argue, is two-fold.  On the one hand, the weight attached to state rights in 
this context – particularly in light of heightened concerns with borders and national 
security following attacks on the World Trade Centre and other targets on 9/11 - 
threatens to overwhelm the human context of the individual right.  This is exacerbated 
by the way in which asylum seekers have been framed in the popular media and on 
occasion by the judiciary
12
 as ‗cheats‘, ‗illegals‘, ‗so-called asylum seekers‘,13 
‗spongers‘ and ‗social parasites‘ on the UK welfare state,14 and potential terrorists;15 
in parliamentary debate as: ―…people who may well be seriously involved in criminal 
activity such as drug dealing, people trafficking and so on.‖;16 and in legal discourse 
as not the responsibility of the state except in limited circumstances.
17
  The combined 
effect of these phenomena is, we argue, that once we accept these two strands of 
‗official discourse‘, the human experience of the displaced or dispossessed person is 
                                                                                                                                            
the UK is subject to obligations under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, as amended by the 1967 
Protocol.  
12
 See ‗Foreign Spongers Scandal, by Judge‘, Daily Express, 29 July 2009, which reported Judge Ian 
Trigger as commenting, in the context of the criminal trial of a failed asylum seeker for drugs 
offences: ―People like you, and there are literally hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people like 
you, come to these shores from foreign countries to avail themselves of the generous welfare benefits 
that exist here. In the past 10 years the national debt of this country has risen to extraordinary heights, 
largely because central Government has wasted billions and billions of pounds…Much of that has 
been wasted on welfare payments.‖; available online at 
http://www.dailyexpress.co.uk/posts/view/117024/Foreign-spongers-scandal-by-Judge- 
13
 For discussion of the negative portrayal of asylum seekers in media and political spaces, see AW 
Khan, ―Countering Media Hegemony, Negative Representations, the ‗Bad Citizen‘: Asylum seekers‘ 
battle for the hearts and minds of Scotland‖ e-Sharp Issue 11; available online at 
http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_81285_en.pdf; A Bloch, ―Refugee settlement in Britain: The impact 
of policy on participation‖ (2000) 12 Journal of Ethics and Migration Studies 367; M Bruter, ―On what 
citizens mean by feeling ‗European‘: Perceptions of news, symbols and borderless-ness‖ (2004) 30 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 21; C Gifford, ―National and post-national dimensions of 
citizenship education in the UK‖ (2004) 8 Citizenship Studies 145. 
14
 See for example two contrasting media headlines on a Report by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission indicating that there is no evidence that people arriving in the UK jump the queue for 
social housing.  Housing Minister John Healy claimed that he: ―…wanted to ‗nail the myth‘ that certain 
groups were losing out in terms of housing allocation.  ‗It is largely a problem of perception…The 
report shows there is a belief, a wrong belief, that there is a bias in the system.‘‖; reported by the BBC 
as ―Housing ‗not favouring migrants‘‖, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8137408.stm; and by the 
Daily Mail as ―One in ten state-subsidised homes goes to an immigrant family‖; 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1198016/One-state-subsidised-homes-goes-immigrant-
family.html?ITO=1490   
15
 D Leppard & J Ungoed-Thomas ‗Asylum seekers form quarter of terror suspects‘, The Sunday 
Times, 15 July 2007, available online at  
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article2076120.ece  
16
 Hansard, HC col 328 (13 March 2007) (Mr Stewart Jackson MP); Still Human Still Here 
‗Parliamentary Briefing – March 2007 – Amendment to UK Borders Bill 2006‘ (2007) available at 
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F3BB18A8-6238-420F-961C-
48E83C6275B9/0/shsh_parliamentary_briefing.pdf, p6; full text of the amendment, p10. 
17
 Where a particular and distinct relationship of dependency exists between the state and vulnerable 
individuals who are subject to threats to their life or degrading living conditions; or where a ‗direct and 
immediate link‘ exists between a particular type of state intervention and maintenance of the essential 
core elements of a meaningful private and family life; see C O‘Cinneide, ―A modest proposal: 
destitution, state responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights‖ (2008) European 
Human Rights Law Review 583.     
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excluded as irrelevant.  This is particularly significant in light of the position of 
asylum seekers as among the most marginalised, poor, and vulnerable people in our 
society.
18
    
 
This article argues that these ‗official discourses‘ imply discursive boundaries which 
inhibit the proper exercise of the balancing act that is required when weighing the 
state‘s right to control its borders as a principle of state sovereignty against the asylum 
seeker‘s right to seek refuge under international law.19  By unpacking the human 
experience of displacement and dispossession for (failed) asylum seekers, we seek to 
resist these discursive boundaries, and rather to set up an ‗oppositional discourse‘ 
which brings social science research knowledge to bear on the processes of evaluating 
law and policy.  We argue that while the dominating discourse excludes questions of 
housing and home for asylum seekers, our alternative perspective is potentially 
transformative, in enabling analyses of law and policy concerning asylum seekers and 
their experiences of housing and home to move beyond the limitations imposed by 
current debates, not least by highlighting their exclusion as a social problem requiring 
policy attention.  In doing so we seek to explore the possibilities for developing new 
thinking on this subject from a person-centred perspective, rooted in analysis of 
asylum seekers‘ experiences of exclusion from the opportunity to establish housing 
and home.
20
   
 
Home, exile and alienation: the human experience of displacement and 
dispossession    
 
The importance of ‗being at home in the world‘ for the human condition, and the 
consequences of alienation from that sense of home, are common philosophical 
themes,
21
 and underpin much political philosophy, from Hegel to Heidegger.  For 
Hegel,
22
 a core theme was the need for human beings to exist not only as rational 
individuals, but as part of the wider world around them, in ‗civil society‘.23  At the 
most basic level, it was recognised that everyone must exist in some relationship with 
place and with a meaningful connection to home – or, in the absence of such a 
meaningful connection, in a state of alienation.
24
  Similarly, Heidegger
25
 argued that 
                                                 
18
 P Coelho, The Return of Asylum Seekers whose Applications have been Rejected in Europe 
(European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2005), Executive Summary. 
19
 On the power of official discourses, see F Burton & P Carlen, Official discourse: On discourse 
analysis, government publications, ideology and the state (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).  
20
 See H van der Horst, ―Living in a Reception Centre: the Search for Home in an Institutional Setting‖ 
(2004) 21 Housing, Theory and Society 36, 37. 
21
 See, for example, D Cooper, The Measure of Things (Oxford, OUP, 2002, 2008) for a philosophical 
account of what it might mean to ‗be at home in the world‘.  Levinas described the home as a 
precondition for existence, since: ‗[m]an abides in the world as having come from a private domain, 
from being at home with himself, to which at each moment he can retire.‘; E Levinas, Totality and 
Infinity (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 152. 
22
 GWF Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (ed, AW Wood, transl, HB Nisbet), (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
23
 Indeed, the themes of ontological homelessness and alienation have been major themes for scholarly 
reflections on the human condition in modernity, particularly in the latter half of the twentieth-century.   
24
 M Heidegger, Bauen, Wohnen, Denken (1951) [‗Building Dwelling Thinking‘] and the 1951 lecture 
…dichterisch wohnet der Mensch [‗…Poetically man dwells…‘], translated by A Hofstadter, Poetry, 
Language, Thought (New York, Harper Colophon Books, 1971). 
25
 M Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1927); Being and Time, translated by J Macquarrie & E Robinson 
(Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1962). 
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people cannot ‗be‘ without having some connection to a particular place.26  Heidegger 
described ‗dwelling‘ as encapsulating meanings including: ‗…to remain, to stay in a 
place…to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain at peace…preserved from 
harm and danger…safeguarded.‘27  The achievement of this state of peace and safety 
is not static but precarious, with Heidegger describing the ‗real plight of dwelling‘ as 
the need for human beings to ‗learn to dwell‘ in the world by ‗ever search[ing] anew 
for the nature of dwelling‘.28   
   
The importance of dwelling as the basis for human existence is brought into sharp 
relief by experiences of exile, and the yearning for a place in which the exile can re-
establish their sense of home in the world.  The human instinct is to seek to recover a 
sense of home in the place one finds oneself, thus: ―[b]eings surround themselves with 
the places where they find themselves, the way one wraps oneself up in a 
garment….‖29  Further, this is seen as a necessary step in maintaining their humanity, 
as: ―[w]ithout places, beings would be only abstractions.‖30  Malpas described 
humans as:   
…the sort of thinking, remembering, experiencing creatures we are only in 
virtue of our active engagement in place…the possibility of mental life is 
necessarily tied to such engagement, and so to the places in which we are so 
engaged…when we come to give content to our concepts of ourselves and to 
the idea of our own self-identity, place and locality play a crucial role….31 
Part of the danger of being an exile is the risk of losing one‘s place in the world 
without then recovering ‗home‘ elsewhere.  As Casey noted: ―[n]ot only may the 
former place be lost but a new place in which to settle may not be found…[the exile 
faces] the risk of having no proper or lasting place, no place to be or remain.‖32  It is 
to enable this recovery of home that Mircescu argued for the need to: ―…recognise 
our sense of home as functional, effective, but ultimately constructed…lead[ing] to a 
much more elastic sense of self as it imaginatively journeys away from and in search 
of home.‖33    
 
The case of asylum seekers demonstrates that when home - meaning the place, 
whether dwelling or homeland, where one belongs - is lost in one location, the human 
instinct is to seek to recover or re-create a new home elsewhere.  Mircescu described 
exile as:  
…an existential evolving triangle shaped on the axes of self, journey and 
home.  In this sense…exile is the epitome of human condition as the three 
axes supply us with co-ordinates reflecting upon each other.  Thus, our sense 
                                                 
26
 ―The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is Buan, 
dwelling.  To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal.  It means to dwell…man is 
insofar as he dwells.‖ Building, Dwelling, Thinking, op cit, n 24, part I.    
27
 Id. 
28
 Id, part II. 
29
 G Poulet, Proustian Space, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1977), 26-27, quoted in JE 
Malpas, Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 176. 
30
 Id.   
31
 Malpas, op cit, n 29, 177. 
32
 ES Casey, Getting Bank into Place – Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1993), preface, xii.   
33
 M Mircescu, ―The Language of Home‖ eSharp, Issue 7, p 3; available online at 
http://www.sharp.arts.gla.ac.uk/issue7/Mirsescu.pdf  
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of self evolves, is not static.  We are what we become…we can both return 
and arrive home.
34
   
While the importance of place for asylum seekers has been recognised in sociological 
literature,
35
 less attention has been paid to the deliberate and explicit policies which 
seek to prevent (failed) asylum seekers from developing a relationship with ‗place‘ in 
the UK.
36
  Yet, the concept of home as a relationship which can be created anew as 
well as one which can be restored underlines the UK‘s explicit policy of encouraging 
failed asylum seekers to return to their home states,
37
 based on an official discourse of 
return (rather than re-settlement) as the route to home for failed asylum seekers.
38
     
 
At the level of the homeland, much has been written about the impact of globalisation 
in de-stabilising traditional ideas of home, homeland and nation, from the emergence 
of new patterns of migration,
39
 to a rise in insecurity and existential uncertainty in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
40
  Blunt and Dowling have indicated that: 
Notions of home are central in these migrations.  Movement may necessitate 
or be precipitated by a disruption to a sense of home, as people leave or in 
some cases flee one home for another.  These international movements are 
also processes of establishing home, as senses of belonging and identity move 
over space and are created in new places.
41
   
The disruption to the refugee‘s sense of belonging, giving rise to ontological 
insecurity and alienation, is ‗multi-scalar‘42 – from disruptions to home or household 
to displacement from home city or nation.  Across these scales, the impact of 
displacement and dispossession on the refugee is reflected in the view that the idea of 
‗homeland‘: ―…invokes a longing and belonging and serves ‗as a point (or set of 
points) of reference for individual social identity‘.‖43 
 
Forced migration has major impacts on home and identity, with displacement and 
dispossession having ―profound and long-term implications‖44 on those who are 
separated from their homes and homelands.  The ‗double displacement‘ of asylum 
seekers constitutes a major interruption with fundamental human needs.  Yet, the 
                                                 
34
 Id, 3-4.   
35
 See for example, N Spicer, ―Places of Exclusion and Inclusion: Asylum-Seeker and Refugee 
Experiences of Neighbourhoods in the UK‖ (2008) 34 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 491. 
36
 We use the concept of ‗place‘ in the sense of a space which has been invested with social meaning, 
see A Buttimer & D Seamon (eds) The Human Experience of Space and Place, (New York, St. 
Martin‘s Press, 1980). 
37
 See the UK Border Agency‘s policy on ‗Voluntary Return‘, available online at 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum/outcomes/unsuccessfulapplications/voluntaryreturn/ 
38
 For example, in debates preceding the UK Borders Act 2007, the Home Office Minister described 
her agenda as: ―…doing the right thing, which is working towards the departure from the UK of those 
who have no right to be here.‖; Hansard, HC col 330 (13 March 2007), (Joan Ryan MP); see also R 
Cholewinski, ―Enforced Destitution of Asylum Seekers in the United Kingdom: The Denial of 
Fundamental Rights‖ (1998) 10 International Journal of Refugee Law 462; S York & N Fancott, 
―Enforced destitution: impediments to return and access section 4 ‗hard cases‘ support‖ (2008) 22 
Journal of Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law 5. 
39
 D Morley, Home Territories: media, mobility and identity (London, Routledge, 2000). 
40
 C Kinnvall, ―Globalisation and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological 
Security‖ (2004) 25 Political Psychology 741.      
41
 A Blunt & R Dowling, Home (London, Routledge, 2006), 2.   
42
 Id, 27. 
43
 Id, 160, quoting CJ Wickham, Constructing Heimat in Post-War Germany: Longing and Belonging 
(Lewiston, NY, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 10. 
44
 Id, 196.   
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ability to recover or re-establish such roots is complicated for asylum seekers where 
there may not be a ‗home‘ to return to.  The destruction of home – ‗domicide‘45 – is 
often manifest at two levels for asylum seekers, where both the home (dwelling 
house) and the homeland have come under attack.  Thus, one analysis of Croatian 
refugees observed that:  
It is not only their concepts of homeland that have been transformed, but also 
their homes in the most basic, physical sense.  From sites of personal control, 
they were transformed into sites of danger and destruction…People were 
forced to leave their homes in response to threat, fears, military orders and 
violent attacks.  Many homes literally ceased to exist.
46
   
The persistence of the need for home after such experiences is captured by Brah in his 
description of a ‗homing desire‘, which, in cases where there is no current prospect of 
resettlement or return – for example, for failed asylum seekers from ‗unreturnable‘ 
countries
47
 - can be understood as a human need to make a home (through re-
settlement), rather than by returning to a homeland.
48
   
   
Yet, the concept of ‗homeland‘ in the context of asylum seekers is a double-edged 
sword, as it has also been employed as a powerful rhetorical device to support post-
9/11 security policies.
49
  The new global ‗domopolitics‘ evokes feelings about the 
sanctity of the home as dwelling place to support stronger measures in safeguarding 
the borders of the nation-state.  This discourse uses the idea of: ―...the home as hearth, 
a refuge or a sanctuary in a heartless world; the home as our place, where we belong 
naturally, and where, by definition, others do not‖;50 as a justification for the priority 
afforded to security considerations, in debates which conflate concerns with borders, 
immigration and asylum.  Thus, we have come to view:  
…international order as a space of homes…[and] home as a place we must 
protect.  We may invite guests into our home, but they come at our invitation; 
they don‘t stay indefinitely.  Others are, by definition, uninvited.  Illegal 
migrants and bogus refugees should be returned to ‗their homes‘.51 
The positive qualities of our ‗homeland as home‘ lend support to the argument that 
‗others‘ must be excluded from it: ―Home is a place to be secured because its contents 
(our property) are valuable and envied by others.‖52  This is also reflected in the 
emphasis in the UK debates on the alleged ‗pull factors‘ that lead asylum seekers to 
select the UK as a host state.  Yet, while the Home Office Minister (in debates 
                                                 
45
 See JD Porteous & SE Smith Domicide: the Global Destruction of Home (Montreal, McGill-Queen‘s 
University Press, 2001); JD Porteous, ―Domicide: The Destruction of Home‖ in D Benjamin (ed), The 
Home: Words, Interpretations, Meanings, Environments (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1995).  
46
 M Povrzanovic Frykman, ―Homeland lost and gained: Croatian diaspora and refugees in Sweden‖ in 
N Al-Ali & K Koser (eds) New Approaches to Migration?  Transnational Communities and the 
Transformation of Home (London, Routledge, 2002), 118; S Carter, ―The geopolitics of diaspora‖ 
(2005) 37 Area 54.  
47
 In 2009, a report for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, H Lewis, Still destitute: a worsening problem 
for refused asylum seekers (York, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2009), reported that a situation of 
absolute desperation is developing among refused asylum seekers in Britain from four of the world's 
most troubled countries (Zimbabwe, Iran, Eritrea and Iraq) – described as ‗unreturnable‘ - who are 
sleeping rough and eating from bins. 
48
 A Brah, Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities (London, Routledge, 1996).   
49
 For example, in the US, the formation of the ‗Department of Homeland Security‘, with its role in 
securing the homeland borders. 
50
 W Walters, ―Secure borders, safe haven, domopolitics‖ (2004) 8 Citizenship Studies 237, 241. 
51
 Id, 241. 
52
 Id, 241. 
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preceding the UK Borders Act 2007) expressed concern that allowing ‗failed‘ asylum 
seekers still in the UK access to support and accommodation until they left voluntarily 
or were removed: ―…would provide a significant pull factor for asylum seekers…‖;53 
research for Joseph Rowntree has found that there is: ―…no simplistic relation 
between how well we treat asylum seekers and how many attempt to come here.‖54  
Similarly, a Home Office research study in 2002 found that the respondent asylum 
seekers were not well informed about how they might be treated vis-à-vis welfare and 
housing after arriving in the UK, and none indicated that the UK was thought to offer 
more generous support than other destination countries.
55
   
 
It is important to distinguish between the two separate issues of ‗pull factors‘ on the 
one hand, and the question of returning failed asylum seekers on the other.  It is 
widely recognised that ‗push factors‘ – the reasons for leaving the home state - are a 
much stronger factor in forced migration than alleged ‗pull factors‘ – the reasons 
asylum seekers may select a particular host state.  For example, recent research which 
has indicated that refugees have little, if any, choice over which country they claim 
asylum in, and that few know what to expect before they arrive in the UK
56
 supports 
the argument that domestic policy in respect of asylum seekers (for example policies 
relating to access to housing, social welfare or the right to work) will have little 
impact on the numbers of asylum seekers who come to the UK.
57
  A separate issue is 
concerned with the decision of failed asylum seekers to remain and the success of 
policies encouraging voluntary return, but again, research has indicated that there is 
limited scope for government policies to influence this, as whether failed asylum 
seekers are likely to go home tends to be dependent on where they have come from
58
 
as even those who become destitute do not choose to return to certain ‗unreturnable‘ 
home states.  Both issues raise questions about the logic of policies which exclude 
(failed) asylum seekers from housing and home, not (primarily) as a matter of 
                                                 
53
 Hansard, HC col 330 (13 March 2007), (Joan Ryan MP). 
54
 Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, Moving on from Destitution to Contribution (York, Joseph 
Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2007), p8.   
55
 V Robinson & J Segrott, Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers (Home Office 
Research Study 243, Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, 2002), p50; 
rather, the priority for asylum seekers was to reach a place of safety; they have very little knowledge of 
the asylum procedures, benefit entitlements or availability of work in the host state: id., Executive 
Summary, p vii.  Böcker & Havinga‘s 1998 study also found that asylum policies and reception 
procedures, for example, housing, were relatively unimportant in the decision to choose a particular 
destination country, with ties, for example colonial links, between the country of origin and country of 
refuge the most important factor, along with the varying physical and legal accessibility of different 
countries and chance events during the journey; A Böcker & T Havinga, Asylum Migration to the 
European Union: Patterns of Origin and Destination, (Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, 1998); A Böcker & T Havinga, ‗Country of asylum by choice or by 
chance: asylum seekers in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK‘, (1999) 25 Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 43-61.  
56
 ―The concept of ‗choice‘ can be understood only in the context of the circumstances under which 
individuals leave their countries of origin. The lives of the research participants are characterised by 
experiences of war, conflict and persecution. It is these ‗push‘ factors that 
are decisive in the decision to migrate, rather than the ‗pull‘ of any particular destination country.‖; H 
Crawley, Chance or choice? Understanding why asylum seekers come to the UK (Refugee Council, 
2010, available online at 
http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/Resources/Refugee%20Council/downloads/rcchance.pdf), p5.     
57
 ―Policies to remove social and economic opportunities for asylum seekers once they have entered a 
country of asylum have produced only limited effects on the number of applications, or no effect at 
all.‖; id, p4.  
58
 See above, n 47.   
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allocating housing resource, but with a view to managing concerns about the volume 
of asylum seekers in the UK and associated fears regarding domestic security and 
control over borders.  
 
Nevertheless, the rhetoric of ‗pull factors‘ linked to the UK welfare state remains 
powerful in justifying the policies adopted by the government, with the concept of 
home used to legitimise a particular political approach towards asylum seekers 
appealing to our concern to safeguard for ourselves the welfare provision which we 
view as valuable and likely to be envied by others.  An example of this is the 
commonly held (and frequently emphasised in the popular media)
59
 misconception 
that migrants - including forced migrants such as asylum seekers - are at the front of 
the queue for social housing allocation,
60
 with the perceived risk that their presence 
displaces the indigenous beneficiaries of social housing.
61
  The issues of immigration 
and social housing sit on a precarious and sensitive political axis, in which one idea of 
home has been set up in opposition to another, with tensions between protecting (and 
defending) the indigenous population‘s sense of home, and allowing home – both 
homeland and housing – to be available to ‗others‘ who have been displaced and 
dispossessed from elsewhere.  Kaplan has described a similar phenomenon in the US 
as: ―…the notion of the homeland itself contribut[ing] to making the life of 
immigrants terribly insecure.‖62   
 
This can be regarded as a deliberate consequence of the domopolitics which 
constructs images of ‗them and us‘ in an effort: ―…to contain citizenship…in the face 
of social forces that are tracing out other cultural and political possibilities [such 
as]…the assertion of a right to settle as ‗illegal‘ and ‗dangerous‘.‖63  Kinnvall has 
suggested that: ―…it is difficult to ignore how concerns about the economic, cultural, 
and social threats posed by refugees and other immigrants have tended to make their 
way into security considerations in both Western and non-Western societies…as state 
rights are pitted against individual rights.‖64  Similarly, where laws and policies 
governing asylum balance state sovereignty against the asylum seeker‘s individual 
rights, the danger is that debates which have at their centre the issue of state security 
and the protection of the homeland for citizens risk losing all sense of balancing 
competing interests.   
 
Shelter, housing and home 
 
Against the likelihood that the asylum seeker will already have experienced: ―…a 
sense of powerlessness and dependence…frequently mixed with an acute anxiety 
about their new circumstances and strong feelings of homelessness‖;65 the impact of 
their precarious claims to housing and home is significant.  In the discussion that 
                                                 
59
 Above, n 13.   
60
 J Rutter & M Latorre, Social Housing Allocation and Immigrant Communities (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, Research Report 4, online at 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/ehrc_report_-
_social_housing_allocation_and_immigrant_communities.pdf  
61
 Shelter, Policy: Discussion paper – No Place Like Home? (London, Shelter, 2008). 
62
 A Kaplan, ‗Homeland insecurities: reflections on language and space‘ (2003) 85 Radical History 
Review 82, 87.   
63
 Walters, op cit, n 50, 256.   
64
 Kinnvall, op cit, n 40, 744. 
65
 Id, 747. 
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follows we consider various circumstances in which asylum seekers may, at different 
stages of the process (while waiting for their claim to be considered, or after their 
claim has been refused), face ‗homelessness‘ in the sense of being without shelter,66 
as well as those cases in which asylum seekers may be provided with a roof over their 
heads but remain ‗homeless‘ in the sense that the evidence clearly indicates that the 
nature of the shelter provided does not satisfy the criteria of ‗housing‘, and is not 
likely to be conducive to feelings of ‗home‘.67   
 
The distinction between being without shelter and being homeless was recognised by 
the UN in its definition of homelessness as: ―a condition of detachment from society 
characterised by the lack of affiliative bonds…carr[ying] implications of belonging 
nowhere rather than having nowhere to sleep.‖68  As ‗non-citizens‘, asylum seekers 
are already marked out as not belonging, not ‗at home‘.  Furthermore, official 
discourse explicitly ties a range of policy goals to the objective of preventing asylum 
seekers from forming affiliative bonds in the UK – from rapid processing of 
applications,
69
 and the imposition of tight restrictions upon the right to work,
70
 to the 
removal of support for failed asylum seekers with children, which Lord Bassam (for 
the government) argued was not intended to force destitution, but to: ―…influence 
behaviour so that people co-operate and to incentivise voluntary return before 
removal is enforced.‖71  This is arguably reinforced by the state‘s wish to prevent 
asylum seekers from establishing a home, family and private life of the sort that might 
attract protection under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
72
 
with the subtext that if asylum seekers are prevented from establishing such links they 
cannot then claim to have suffered an interference under Article 8 when their removal 
from the UK is ordered.   
 
The UN Refugee Convention specifies some economic, social and cultural rights for 
persons recognised as refugees.  However, whilst the person is still an asylum seeker 
awaiting the determination of their claim to be a refugee, the rights derived from the 
Refugee Convention generally do not apply.
73
  States may choose to assimilate 
                                                 
66
 More literally, ‗houselessness‘.   
67
 Report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‗The Treatment of Asylum Seekers‘, HL (2006-07) 
81-I; HC (2006-07) 60-I CHR, para. 104.    
68
 UNCHS/Habitat, Strategies to Combat Homelessness (UN Centre for Human Settlements, Nairobi, 
2000), xiii. 
69
 Fairer, faster and firmer – A modern approach to immigration and asylum, Cm 4018, (London, TSO, 
1998).  The rapid processing of applications is also a central goal of the ‗New Asylum Model‘, 
Controlling our borders: Making migration work for Britain - five-year strategy for asylum and 
immigration, www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm64/6472/6472.pdf; see also Home 
Office Press Release 18th January 2006 ‗New Asylum Model: Swifter decisions – Faster removals‘, 
http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releases/new-asylum-model-swifter-decisio.  
70
 After one year asylum seekers may apply for permission to work (but not to become self-employed 
or to engage in a business or professional activity), so long as they can demonstrate that they are not 
responsible for the delay in processing their application for asylum; Immigration Rule 360; Rule 360A 
adds that any permission to work will expire when a claim is ‗fully determined‘, thus excluding failed 
asylum seekers from working. 
71
 Hansard, HL, col 287 (July 12, 2007) (Lord Bassam). 
72
 See R (on the application of Shahid) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWHC 
2550, where the theoretical possibility of an asylum seeker relying on Article 8 as a reason for 
remaining was accepted by the court. 
73
 See R v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants and ex parte B [1996] 4 All ER 385 (CA); [1997] 1 WLR 275 (Simon Brown LJ at 292 
noting that ‗no obligation arises under Art 24 [Refugee Convention] until asylum seekers are 
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welfare support and social housing for asylum seekers with the national population, to 
separate it entirely, or to hold asylum seekers in detention.  Yet, even where asylum 
seekers receive shelter in the sense of a roof over their heads, for example, in an 
accommodation centre, or in temporary accommodation such as a ‗bed and breakfast‘, 
the nature and quality of the accommodation may be such as to call into question 
whether this amounts to ‗housing‘ as defined by the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights: that is, as including ―…adequate privacy, adequate space, 
adequate security, adequate lighting and ventilation, adequate basic infrastructure and 
adequate location with regard to work and basic facilities…‖74  Merely providing a 
roof overhead does not suffice to satisfy even the most basic housing needs to enable 
a person to function in society, and it is evident that this is not likely (and deliberately 
so) to satisfy the human need for ‗home‘.    
 
The degree of overlap between the components of ‗adequate housing‘ and the 
meanings of home for occupiers (family, privacy, security, control, continuity, self-
expression and personal identity)
75
 are striking when considering the availability of 
‗adequate housing‘ and ‗sense of home‘ for asylum seekers.  Studies of home 
meanings and ontological security have emphasised the importance of permanence,
76
 
rootedness
77
 and continuity
78
 in providing a feeling of security at home.
79
  Where the 
experiences of asylum seekers living in temporary accommodation do not correspond 
to these normative ideas of home they can be described as ‗unhomely‘.80  On the one 
hand, we recognise that people can (and human nature suggests that they will seek to) 
create home wherever they find themselves, however, the transitory nature of asylum 
seeker status (in respect of both the host state and in relation to their housing) is 
already associated with uncertainty and insecurity, which in turn will tend to 
undermine the extent to which ‗home-making‘ is likely to be successful;81 the asylum 
seeker is thus to some extent excluded from home meanings by their transient status, 
                                                                                                                                            
recognized as refugees. […]  Not for one moment would I suggest that prior to that time their rights are 
remotely the same‘); Cholewinksi, op cit, n 38, 477; R Cholewinski, ―Economic and Social Rights of 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Europe‖ (2000) 14 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 709, 711; 
C Sawyer & P Turpin, ―Neither Here Nor There: Temporary Admission to the UK‖ (2005) 17 
International Journal of Refugee Law 688, 688.      
74
 See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 4, ‗The right to 
adequate housing (Art.11 (1)) : . 13/12/91. CESCR General comment 4’; available online at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CESCR+General+comment+4.En?OpenDocument  
75
 Fox, op cit, n 1, Chapter Four. 
76
 A Dupuis & DC Thorns, ―Home, Home ownership and the search for ontological security‖ (1998) 48 
Sociological Review 24. 
77
 The physical feeling of being anchored in a place; see SG Smith, ―The Essential Qualities of a 
Home‖ [1994] Journal of Environmental Psychology 31, 32.  
78
 ―[H]aving a place to return to, where one feel a sense of belonging, also engenders feelings of 
continuity, stability and permanence‘; id.   
79
 A Rapoport, ―A Critical Look at the Concept ‗Home‘‖, in Benjamin, op cit, n 44; R Sebba & A 
Churchman, ―The Uniqueness of Home‖ (1986) 3 Architecture and Behaviour 7.   
80
 Blunt & Dowling, op cit, n 41, 26. 
81
 For example, in a study of young homeless adults living in shelter accommodation in London, it was 
noted that while the occupiers sought to create a sense of home and belonging where they were located, 
and in some sense this could be successful, where the facilities provided by the shelter were such as to 
offer them security, independence and freedom, and a sense of family, that at the same time: ―…this 
was also an unhomely home because this sense of belonging was always invaded by a sense that this 
home was neither permanent nor did it accord with their ideal of home.‖; P Kellett & J Moore, ―Routes 
to home: homelessness and home-making in contrasting societies‖ (2003) 27 Habitat International 123, 
133.   
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even when that transience becomes long-term.  This is exacerbated when the housing 
environment is ‗unhomely‘.  For example, Diken described refugee spaces (whether 
‗open‘ spaces, such as accommodation centres, reception centres, or closed spaces 
such as detention centres) as ‗non-places‘;82 refugee spaces are often deliberately 
located (for example as part of the UK‘s strategy of dispersal):83 ―...outside cities, in 
suburbia or in rural areas, as a rule in demonstrably peripheral sites…‖;84 away from 
amenities and facilities, and in Diken‘s study were found to be:  
…characterised by a sterilised, mono-functional enclosure: contact with the 
outer world is physically minimised behind the fences, which yield no 
permission to touch the outer world resulting in the complete isolation of the 
refugee from public life.
85
 
The need for displaced persons to re-establish some sense of home for their mental 
and physical wellbeing was emphasised in van der Horst‘s Dutch study of asylum 
seekers living in reception centres, which found that, while policy discourse tended to 
focus on efficiency, functionality and the provision of shelter, when discussing their 
lives in the centre the residents used home discourses to describe their experiences, 
including their frustration at not having ‗even the most basic attributes of home‘.86   
 
While we would not dispute that efficiency, functionality and shelter are important 
policy values, so too is the ‗home‘ perspective, which: ―…is hardly represented in the 
dominant discourse.‖  This is perhaps not surprising if the policy question is the 
systemic issue of what to ‗do‘ with asylum seekers:87 
Talk about the right to a home is very marginal when the people involved are 
not legal residents, as is the case with asylum seekers.  The centres are hardly 
aimed at providing a home.  The concern is with giving a shelter and making 
the procedure run smoothly.  Functionality within the aims of the asylum 
procedure is top priority…it is a discourse of temporality, insecurity and 
authority…88      
The home meanings most often missed by residents were autonomy (for example, the 
ability to choose what you eat, and to prepare it) and the freedom to live in 
accordance with cultural customs.
89
  Furthermore, the Dutch study found that:  
…officials make no real effort to make the institutions homelike.  Rather, 
homelike attachments to the centres are discouraged.  An institutional 
                                                 
82
 Diken uses Augé‘s terminology: M Augé, Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of 
Supermodernity (London, Verso, 1995); B Diken, ―From Refugee Camps to Gated Communities: 
Biopolitics and the End of the City‖ (2004) 8 Citizenship Studies 83, 91.  
83
 The policy of dispersal was implemented under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, and has been 
heavily criticised: C Boswell, Spreading the Costs of Asylum Seekers: A Critical Analyses of Dispersal 
Policies in Germany and the UK (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 
http://www.researchasylum.org.uk/?lid=141; P Hynes, The Compulsory Dispersal of Asylum Seekers 
and Processes of Social Exclusion in England (Summary of Findings, Middlesex University, 2006), 
http://www.mdx.ac.uk/HSSc/research/centres/sprc/docs/Summary_of_Findings.pdf; A Anie, N Daniel, 
C Tah, A Petruckevitch, An exploration of factors affecting the Successful dispersal of asylum seekers 
(RDS Online report 50/05, Home Office, 2005), 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr5005.pdf.    
84
 Diken, op cit, n 82, 91. 
85
 Id. 
86
 van der Horst, op cit n 20. 
87
 Id. 
88
 Id, 41. 
89
 For example, the absence of men and women‘s spaces, and cultural norms on suitable relations 
between family members. 
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discourse produces the quality standards and suppresses home associated 
standards…The centres are measured against the standards of cost and 
efficiency.  Food, hygiene and sleep are the three main criteria.
90
   
Conversely, from the asylum seeker‘s perspective: ―[f]unctionality and efficiency, as 
stressed in the policy, are terms hardly used by the respondents.  Bed, bath and bread, 
considered sufficient in the opinion of the policymakers, is clearly not sufficient to 
them.‖91  Residents tended to respond in two ways to this absence of home: some 
residents attempted to adapt their lives in the centre to make it more ‗homely‘; 
however, ―…[i]n other situations…the lack of a ‗home‘ caused mental and physical 
suffering.‖92   
 
These characteristics are also evident in the UK discourse, with its emphasis on 
efficiency, functionality and the policy goals of ‗containing‘ asylum seekers, keeping 
them out of the workforce, and encouraging return when applications for asylum have 
failed.  For example, in 2002 the Government identified criteria by which a trial of 
accommodation centres would be assessed as including improvements in the asylum 
process, for example: closer contact between asylum seekers and the relevant 
authorities; reduced decision times by tighter management of the interview and 
decision-making process; fewer opportunities for illegal working during the 
application process; minimal opportunities for financial or housing fraud; reduction in 
community tensions; and facilitating integration for those granted a status in the UK 
and voluntary return packages for those who are refused;
93
 with a focus on costs and 
processing times.
94
  While these criteria are obviously important from the government 
perspective, and a quick positive decision is advantageous for the asylum seeker, the 
dominance of bureaucratic functionality to the exclusion of the ‗home‘ experiences 
while living in accommodation centres has negative implications for asylum seekers 
while awaiting determination of their claims.   
 
Failed Asylum Seekers  
 
Recent studies have also emphasised the negative impact of experiences of (lack of) 
home for failed asylum seekers who are denied access to housing and home.  A series 
of interviews with rejected asylum seekers carried out by Amnesty International in 
2006: ―…revealed lives on the margins of society, abject poverty and individual 
struggles to survive with whatever help could be found, with health problems and 
degrees of psychological distress directly related to this painful limbo existence.‖95  
The human costs of destitution for rejected asylum seekers included depression and 
other mental health problems, and they were described as having been ―stripped of 
their dignity‖ and having ―given up hope of ever living normal lives.‖96  Through this 
lens, it can be seen that while maintaining an environment in which refused asylum 
seekers remain not at home is designated as a positive outcome within the boundaries 
of the dominant discourse, such approaches have adverse human consequences.  Yet, 
                                                 
90
 Op cit, n 20, 45. 
91
 Id. 
92
 Id. 
93
 Home Office, Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain, Cm 5387 
(London, TSO, 2002), para 4.39.   
94
 Id, para 4.40. 
95
 Amnesty International, Down and Out in London: The Road to Destitution for Rejected Asylum 
Seekers, (London, Amnesty International UK, 2006), 14.  
96
 Id; see pp15-17 for accounts of these impacts in the voices of refused asylum seekers.     
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these human consequences are largely excluded from legal decision-making in 
England and Wales.  
 
Asylum-seekers have been described as: ―…among the most legally and socially 
disadvantaged people in western societies.‖97  In addition, successive policies pursued 
by UK governments have heightened asylum seekers‘ vulnerability and sense of 
dislocation by adding conditions to and restrictions upon their right to, and ability to, 
access and participate in the labour market and to obtain social housing, with the 
combined effect of rendering many asylum seekers destitute.
98
  This was highlighted 
in a series of research studies for the Rowntree Trust,
99
 the most recent of which 
found that over a third of failed asylum seekers in Leeds had been destitute for over a 
year.  The Rowntree reports also refuted the government‘s claim that no asylum 
seekers need to be destitute, finding that substantial numbers were destitute because 
of inadequate administration.
100
  Yet still, for most purposes asylum seekers remain 
totally excluded from employment,
101
 from the safety net against homelessness 
offered to UK and EU nationals,
102
 and from the minimum benefits that anyone else 
in the UK might expect,
103
 thus curtailing their access to all the key provisions that for 
others prevent destitution.     
 
These policies can be justified in the official discourse – to diminish alleged ‗pull 
factors‘, or because (failed) asylum seekers are ‗undeserving‘ or worse, likely to be 
criminal – and when these considerations are used to frame the debate, the impact of 
the policies on the human experience of the asylum seeker is marginalised, even 
rendered irrelevant.  The exclusion of asylum seekers from housing and home is not 
defined as a problem, but is a ‗non-problem‘, and so does not require a solution 
through the policy agenda.  However, reviewing the widespread destitution of failed 
asylum seekers through the ‗oppositional discourse‘ of the human experience of 
displacement and dispossession casts into sharp relief the competing individual 
interest that should be weighed against the dominant interests of the state in these 
circumstances: the interest in establishing home through housing.    
  
Yet, conversely, government policies as given effect through law have sought to use 
the denial of housing as a means of coercing certain types of behaviour from asylum 
seekers.  For example, section 55 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
2002 provided that asylum seekers who did not apply for asylum ―as soon as 
reasonably practicable‖ on arrival in the UK could be denied accommodation 
otherwise available to asylum seekers, with the expectation that the (threat of) denial 
of accommodation would induce more rapidly filed applications.  Likewise, and 
                                                 
97
 S Castles & A Davidson, Citizenship and Migration: Globalisation and the politics of belonging 
(London, Macmillan, 2000), 73. 
98
 Above, n 70; Cholewinski, op cit, n 38; O‘Cinneade, op cit, n 17.  
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 See K Adie, J Baggini, C Griffiths, B Kilgallon, S Warsi, Moving on: From Destitution to 
Contribution (York, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2007); D Brown, Not Moving On: Still 
Destitute in Leeds (York, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2008); H Lewis, Still Destitute: A 
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 Above, n 70.  
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 Under the Housing Act 1996, s186, asylum seekers are not considered homeless if they have any 
accommodation, ‗however temporary‘ available to them. 
103
 Since the enactment of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, adult asylum seekers have been 
excluded from the mainstream benefits system in the UK; discussed further below.   
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despite Government protestations to the contrary, it remains the case that the law 
continues to condone the destitution of failed asylum seekers, with the (threat of) 
denial of accommodation intended to support the policy of return by encouraging 
asylum seekers to leave the UK.  These policies reveal a paradox: while they typically 
give little weight to the asylum seeker‘s interest in re-establishing ‗home‘, it is the 
universally acknowledged human need for ‗home‘, and the deleterious effects of 
denying access to a meaningful home experience, that underpins their power to 
coerce.   
 
The provision of support to asylum seekers in the UK has been described by the 
parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights as ‗a confusing mess‘.104  By the 
1990s, the rights of asylum seekers to social security benefits were being 
progressively extinguished, and when combined with a general prohibition on the 
right of asylum seekers to work, the vulnerability and exposure that this engendered in 
respect of housing and home was clear.
105
  This, in turn, has emphasised the power of 
the dominant discourse, which has sought to minimise the state‘s obligations towards 
asylum seekers in respect of housing and home, not only deflecting attention from 
their human experiences but also allowing their living conditions at the most basic 
level to be determined according to the political agenda.
106
   
 
The withdrawal of housing rights for asylum seekers set the scene for the progressive 
erosion of the state‘s welfare obligations towards asylum seekers by limiting the duty 
owed by local authorities under Part III of the Housing Act 1985 where the applicant 
was a homeless asylum seeker.  For example, section (4) of the Asylum and 
Immigration Appeals Act 1993
107
 provided that asylum seekers were ineligible for 
housing assistance if they had any accommodation in the UK, however temporary; 
furthermore, where an asylum seeker was eligible for housing, ―any need of his for 
accommodation shall be regarded as temporary only.‖108  There is some evidence that 
the courts were prepared to extend this duty as far as the legislation permitted.  In R v 
Kensington & Chelsea ex parte Irina Korneva
109
 the Court of Appeal – in a judgment 
expressed in the language of statutory construction - held that this temporary housing 
should still be ‗suitable‘ in terms of the condition of the property:110 ―There is, 
however…no distinction drawn between the discharge of duty towards eligible 
asylum-seekers with no accommodation and other homeless persons.‖111  While 
accepting that the ‗right to housing‘ safety net had been reduced by Parliament, the 
court did not accept the invitation to further encroach on the duty owed to asylum 
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seekers by local authorities, and, significantly, were explicit in equating the position 
of asylum seekers entitled to temporary housing with citizens who fell into the same 
category. 
 
Meanwhile, in 1996, the Social Security (Persons from Abroad) Miscellaneous 
Amendment Regulations were passed to remove the entitlement to social security 
benefits of asylum seekers who did not claim asylum at the point of entry into the UK 
(with the use of delegated legislation perhaps indicating a desire to avoid the 
controversy that might be engendered by open debate and scrutiny in the public forum 
of the Houses of Parliament).  These Regulations were successfully challenged in R v 
Secretary of State for Social Security Ex p. Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants,
112
 when Brown LJ noted that the Regulations would either encourage 
potential refugees to leave the UK before concluding their appeals or, would: 
―…necessarily contemplate for some a life so destitute that to my mind no civilised 
nation can tolerate it.‖113  In upholding the asylum seekers‘ challenge to the 
legislation, Brown LJ reasoned that:    
Parliament cannot have intended a significant number of genuine asylum 
seekers to be impaled on the horns of so intolerable a dilemma: the need either 
to abandon their claims to refugee status or alternatively to maintain them as 
best they can but in a state of utter destitution.  Primary legislation alone could 
in my judgment achieve that sorry state of affairs.
114
 
Indeed, this comment proved to be prophetic, and the Asylum and Immigration Act 
1996 was enacted to more securely achieve the aims of the impugned Regulations.   
 
With limited rights to housing and no entitlement to social security asylum seekers 
faced with destitution began to assert rights under the residual safety net of the UK‘s 
welfare state provided by the National Assistance Act 1948.
115
  Of course, the residual 
safety-net of the 1948 Act could only ever be partial and inadequate, since it was not 
designed to support housing or provide homes - in contrast to the homelessness 
provisions in the Housing Acts, from which asylum seekers had been excluded.  In R 
v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council, Ex parte M
116
 the Court of 
Appeal held that asylum seekers who were sleeping rough and going without food 
were covered by section 21(1)(a) of the NAA 1948, which imposes upon every local 
council a duty to provide residential accommodation ―for persons who by reason of 
age, infirmity or any other circumstances are in need of care and attention which is 
not otherwise available to them.‖  One of the most significant consequences of this 
decision was that it transferred primary responsibility for housing many asylum 
seekers on to local authorities.  The incoming Labour government responded with the 
White Paper ‗Fairer, Faster and Firmer: A Modern Approach to Immigration and 
Asylum‘,117 followed by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which created an 
alternative to the residual safety net of the 1948 Act in the form of a separate national 
system administered by the new National Asylum Support Service (NASS).   
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The shift to the national system in the 1999 Act prompted the removal of the limited 
right to (temporary) housing from local authorities.
118
  In its place, under section 95, 
NASS support may be provided to asylum seekers ‗who appear to the Secretary of 
State to be destitute or to be likely to become destitute‘.  Under section 4, the 
Secretary of State may also provide support through NASS to destitute failed asylum 
seekers, subject to strict criteria such as demonstrating, with evidence, that there is no 
safe route of return or that they have a physical or medical impediment to travelling 
(such as the latter stages of pregnancy).
119
  The notable consequences of separating 
the welfare support of asylum seekers from other people in the UK included the sense 
of ‗otherness‘ that it brought, as well as undermining the expectation that asylum 
seekers should be treated comparably to equally vulnerable nationals.  For example, 
the level of cash support that a single asylum seeker aged 25 or over is entitled to is 
calculated at 70 per cent of the income support level for non-asylum seeking adults.
120
   
 
The human experience of asylum seekers is further obscured by the way that legal 
discourse has been dominated not by the rights of the applicants, but by the division 
of financial responsibilities between national and local government.  One of the quirks 
of the NASS system is that if the asylum seeker was eligible for local authority 
support under the NAA 1948, then they would not be ‗destitute‘ and so would not 
qualify for NASS accommodation.  Foreseeing this eventuality, the 1999 Act had 
attempted to curtail access to local authority support by inserting a new section 
21(1A) into the NAA, excluding the provision of local authority support to persons 
subject to immigration control where their need for care and attention arises ‗solely‘ 
because of destitution or the physical effects of destitution upon them.  Cases 
concerning access to local authority support under section 21(1)(a) NAA 1948 thus 
became known as ‗destitution plus‘ cases, but in R v Wandsworth London Borough 
Council, Ex parte O and R v Leicester City Council, Ex parte Bhikha,
121
 the Court of 
Appeal again applied an expansive interpretation, dampening the effect of the new 
section 21(1A) by indicating that virtually any infirmity would mean that the need for 
care and attention was not ‗solely‘ because of destitution: ―If there are to be 
immigrant beggars on our streets, then let them at least not be old, ill or disabled.‖122 
 
This has created difficulties where particular local authorities, especially in South East 
England, have come under pressure to provide support to asylum seekers in need of 
care and attention.
123
  Crucially, since the obligation stems from welfare and not 
immigration law, the local authority may owe duties to failed asylum seekers in need 
of care and attention as well as those awaiting asylum decisions.
124
  At a political 
level, it is perhaps understandable that local authorities resent footing the bill since 
immigration is seen as a quintessentially national government issue.  However, the 
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consequence has been a series of cases where local and national government have 
disputed who is responsible for providing accommodation support for particular 
asylum seekers,
125
 giving rise to what Sweeney has described as: ―…an inverted and 
unseemly turf war between local and central government.‖126 
 
In R (on the application of M) (FC) v Slough Borough Council,
127
 Baroness Hale 
revealed that the senior judiciary had not foreseen this turn of events,
128
 but noted that 
the policy aims of the 1999 scheme included: ―…the deterrent effect of making the 
claimants‘ situation ‗less eligible‘.‖129  In a re-assertion of the ‗deserving‘ asylum 
seeker as victim (rather than rights-bearer or contributor), the decision in Slough
130
 
suggests that ‗destitution plus‘ cases will now be limited to those persons whose need 
does not arise solely from destitution but who also need ‗looking after‘.131  This has 
opened a gateway for local authorities to re-examine the circumstances of the persons 
to whom they are providing accommodation under section 21(1)(a) NAA 1948 and to 
cease support for those who do not meet the stricter conditions set out in Slough.  In 
theory, (failed) asylum seekers consequently excluded from local authority support 
and at risk of destitution can now seek support under the national system administered 
by NASS.  However, in reality, they are likely to face administrative delays, complex 
application processes, and, ultimately, barriers in accessing housing which is capable 
of functioning as home.      
 
These issues have been recognised in several reports scrutinising the accommodation 
provided when an asylum seeker is eligible under NASS.  The two key issues which 
have emerged, location and quality, reflect the discussion in the previous section 
concerning the experiences of asylum seekers in ‗un-homely‘ accommodation.  The 
issue of location is rooted in the policy of dispersal,
132
 which has come under 
criticism from the UK‘s House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC).  The 
primary criterion in the dispersal process is the availability of accommodation, which 
the PAC has recognised: ―…can result in individuals becoming isolated.‖133  In 
addition, the 2007 Joint Committee on Human Rights Report on the Treatment of 
Asylum Seekers found evidence that the quality of NASS accommodation is 
unsatisfactory and falls short of what is required under the Article 8 ECHR right to 
respect for home, family and private life.
134
  While the PAC report suggests that there 
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may be some scope for ‗housing as home‘ considerations – that is, considerations that 
go beyond concern with mere shelter - to be represented in policy discourse on 
housing for asylum seekers, at a judicial level these issues have been obscured by the 
debate concerning the obligations of local authorities vis-à-vis central government.  In 
addition, there remain considerable challenges to the development of legal strategies 
that can effectively represent the asylum seeker‘s interest in securing accommodation 
which can function as a home, against the state‘s expressed interest in avoiding the 
establishment of home attachments in the UK during the asylum process.       
 
The decision in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Adam, 
Limbuela and Tesema
135
 suggested that, even in the face of concerns regarding the 
costs imposed on local authorities in respect of NAA support for asylum seekers, and 
the explicit aim of reserving NASS support as a ‗last resort‘, the House of Lords could 
recognise the human impact where asylum seekers were excluded from housing and 
home.  This case concerned section 55(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act 2002 (NIAA), which places the Home Secretary under a duty to exclude from the 
national scheme asylum seekers who do not make their application for asylum ‗as 
soon as reasonably practicable‘, thus reinforcing the legislative policy to restrict 
access to the nationally administered system.  Nevertheless, a ‗safety net‘ under 
section 55(5) NIAA does ‗not prevent‘ the Home Secretary exercising a power to 
support to the extent necessary for the purpose of avoiding a breach of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, so preventing the Act from requiring the Home 
Secretary to act in such a way as to conflict with section 6(1) of the Human Rights 
Act 1998.
136
     
 
Each applicant had been excluded from access to support by virtue of section 55(1), 
but the power under section 55(5) was not exercised.  The facts presented to the 
House of Lords indicated that the applicants had experienced considerable hardship, 
including sleeping rough, and the House of Lords went on to hold that the Home 
Secretary‘s failure to exercise the power under section 55(5) NIAA 2002 amounted to 
a violation of their right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment under 
Article 3 ECHR,
137
 with the court paying particular attention to the attempt to use the 
threat of destitution to coerce asylum seekers to apply promptly for asylum.  It is 
significant that this case was adjudicated on the basis of Article 3 ECHR, often 
considered the only ‗absolute‘ right in the Convention.138  At one level this provides a 
welcome recognition that homelessness and destitution strike at the heart of what it 
means to be human, potentially constituting one of the most serious forms of human 
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rights violation recognised by the ECHR.  However, as well as reserving protection 
only to those cases with the most extreme adverse facts, the reliance on Article 3 in 
this context also emphasised (by their absence) the contingent nature of the right to 
respect for home under Article 8, as well as the unenforceability of the right to 
adequate housing in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.
139
 
 
There remains some dispute as to whether the UK government is in fact following a 
policy of using (the threat of) forced destitution as a means of coercing failed asylum 
seekers to return to their home state.  At the end of the asylum process, a failed 
asylum seeker may be ‗removed‘ from the UK, however it is recognised that making a 
successful forced removal is challenging,
140
 with the most recent report of the PAC 
observing that since its previous report removals of failed asylum seekers have 
actually decreased.
141
  Successful return is highly dependent on the failed asylum 
seeker‘s willingness to make a ‗voluntary‘ departure from the UK, and restricting 
entitlements to social assistance including housing has become a standard means of 
encouraging departure.
142
   
 
A destitute failed asylum seeker has two potential avenues of support as a matter of 
UK law.
143
  If removal directions have not been made, or the failed asylum seeker is 
complying with such directions,
144
 and they are in the UK not in breach of the 
immigration laws,
145
 then they may benefit from section 21 NAA 1948 ‗destitution 
plus‘ support in the same way as an asylum seeker, so long as they meet the ‗needs 
looking after‘ criteria outlined in Slough.  Secondly, where the ‗destitution plus‘ 
criteria are not met, a destitute failed asylum seeker may apply for NASS ‗hard case‘ 
support under section 4 of the IAA 1999.  Unlike NASS support, section 4 support 
does not result in cash payments, but consists of self-catering accommodation plus 
£35 per week in vouchers.  Significantly, the use of vouchers rather than cash may 
further exacerbate the stigmatisation of failed asylum seekers, limiting their choice as 
to where they purchase goods to meet their essential needs
146
 and so compounding the 
lack of autonomy which renders this type of accommodation ‗unhomely‘.147   
 
Most importantly for the reality of the human experience of failed asylum seekers, if a 
failed asylum seeker does not comply with removal directions then they become 
ineligible either for NASS ‗hard case‘ support or for local authority ‗destitution plus‘ 
provision,
148
 so excluding them from all access to rights that for others prevent 
destitution.  It is assumed that the stark choice between destitution and ‗voluntary‘ 
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return will encourage people whose application for asylum has been rejected, and yet 
who still refuse to return ‗home‘, to leave the UK.  Yet a report by the Independent 
Asylum Commission in 2008 showed that less than 4% of failed asylum seekers still 
in the UK receive support under the section 4 scheme.
149
  Unless they qualify for local 
authority support, the remainder remain in the UK without the right to work and, 
without any recourse to public support, reliant on charitable and voluntary 
organisations.
150
            
 
A crucial question is whether, given that the failed asylum seeker has the option of 
returning ‗voluntarily‘ to their state of origin, the state is responsible if they become 
destitute.  If the UK is responsible, then following Adam, Limbuela and Tesema this 
would appear to be an infringement of Article 3 ECHR.  Indeed, the exclusion from 
support of failed asylum seekers who do not comply with removal orders
151
 can be 
suspended under paragraph 3 of Schedule 3 NIAA 2002 in order to avoid a violation 
of the ECHR or EU law.  However, the orthodoxy is that the ‗choice‘ of the asylum 
seeker to remain in the UK severs the government‘s responsibility for the destitution 
so that no violation of the ECHR arises and the safeguard is not triggered.
152
  In all of 
these cases, the impact of exclusion from housing and home on failed asylum seekers 
has not been a feature of the policy debates, leading Lord Sandwich to suggest that: 
―[o]nce a person is to be removed from the UK, it seems that our famous sense of 
decency and much-advertised belief in human dignity are removed at the same 
time.‖153 
 
Conclusions  
 
The deliberate and explicit exclusion of asylum seekers from the opportunity to 
establish home through adequate housing in the UK pursues a clear and identifiable 
agenda: to reduce alleged ‗pull factors‘, to discourage the formation of ‗home‘ 
attachments in the UK and to incentivise return, as well as focusing asylum policy on 
considerations of security, efficiency and the desire to clamp down on allegedly 
fraudulent or false claims of asylum.  However, this article argues that the dominant 
focus on these considerations has also excluded consideration of the human needs of 
asylum seekers, who are denied the opportunity to establish housing and house while 
waiting for their claim to be determined or after a claim has been refused, leading to 
what we have termed ‗double displacement‘.  While it is proper that legal and policy 
decisions concerning the treatment of asylum seekers be determined by balancing the 
interests of the state against the individual, we argue that the power of the dominant 
discourse has excluded any sense of balancing individual interests, including the need 
for housing and home.  The impact of government rhetoric in this context has been 
recognised in recent years.  For example, in a House of Lords debate on Immigration 
and Asylum in 2005, Lord Sandwich claimed that:      
…asylum seekers are again becoming the cannon fodder of an election 
campaign.  In some ways, Labour and Tory thinking in another place has 
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converged into a more aggressive stance….  The Government‘s new strategy 
has been greeted with dismay by those who work with asylum seekers.  Its 
robust language—of crackdowns and rooting out abuse—amounts to an 
obvious manifesto.
154
   
In the same debate, Baroness Neuberger added: ―I am appalled by the tone of the 
debate coming from both the Conservatives and the Government.‖;155 while the Lord 
Bishop of Leicester expressed concerned for: ―…the most vulnerable in our towns and 
cities whose lives, freedoms and rights are most likely to be subtly undermined by the 
tone of our immigration debates.‖156   
 
The position of asylum seekers as amongst the most marginalised, vulnerable and 
poor people in our society also provides a powerful reminder of the power of rhetoric 
in constructing a class of people who are ‗them‘ not ‗us‘, and the implications of such 
abstractions for law and policy discourse.  In a seminal article focusing on the rhetoric 
of poverty,
157
 Thomas Ross demonstrated how the way in which we talk and argue 
about poverty reveals what we believe about ourselves and others, with the rhetorical 
separation of ‗the poor‘ as different, deviant, morally weak, making more coherent the 
physical separation of the poor from the affluent in society.  Ross argued that this 
rhetoric is achieved, in part, through the separation and stigmatisation of people in 
poverty using rhetorical themes of difference and deviance, and also through the 
premise that we are helpless to change the ‗harsh realities‘ of society, thus placing the 
‗problem‘ of poverty beyond judicial power or jurisdiction.158  It is this rhetoric, Ross 
argued, that enables us to distinguish groups of people as ‗them‘ and ‗us‘, and ―to 
make their suffering intellectually coherent.‖159  
 
The parallel between the rhetoric of poverty and the dominant discourse towards 
asylum seekers in the UK is highlighted by Ross‘ observation that: 
Historically, we have often encouraged…change on the part of the poor by 
making the conditions of poverty so appalling that we imagine poor people 
will do whatever it takes to avoid them.  We are disappointed when so many 
poor people seem to insist on not mending their ways and, to our surprise, 
seem willing to go on living in the horrific conditions of poverty.  This 
disappointment feeds the argument of helplessness.  If poor people are 
unwilling to change their behavior and values in response to the strongest of 
incentives, the horror of life in poverty, what else can we do?
160
    
This analysis echoes the official policy of ‗encouraging‘ failed asylum seekers to 
leave the UK through denying them the opportunity to establish a secure base for 
housing and home.  If failed asylum seekers will not leave, even when denied access 
to the opportunity to establish home, what else can we do?  Furthermore, just as the 
poor are conceptually separated into ‗deserving‘ and ‗undeserving‘ poor, so too 
asylum seekers are identified as ‗genuine‘ (and so successful in their claims) or 
‗fraudulent‘ (and so refused asylum).  ‗Undeserving‘ asylum seekers are, furthermore, 
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denied the means (through the denial of the right to work) to join the ‗deserving‘ 
members of society.
161
  Meanwhile, the human experiences of (absence of) housing 
and home for (undeserving) asylum seekers – the reasoning goes - are not our 
responsibility or our concern.  Added to this, the dominant policy rhetoric, with its 
power base in the need to secure our home borders, easily overshadows the human 
impact of this exclusion.   
 
It has often been said that the measure of a society is in how it treats its most 
vulnerable members.  This article argues that the discourse surrounding asylum 
seekers and their access to housing and home must begin to allow scope within the 
framework of debate for a more humanistic perspective, which recognises the 
vulnerability of (failed) asylum seekers, and the impact of exclusion from housing and 
home on their wellbeing.  While we are not necessarily advocating a major u-turn in 
policies concerning jobs and welfare, we do argue that there is a need for a greater 
measure of fairness and balance in the ways in which we debate issues of housing and 
home, so that we treat asylum seekers as people rather than excluding consideration of 
their human experiences.  This is particularly apt in light of evidence suggesting that 
government concerns regarding alleged ‗pull factors‘ are unfounded:162 there is no 
need to treat people in such a non-human way.  Even allowing that there may be cases 
in which asylum seekers commit crimes, or make fraudulent claims, this does not 
make them so ‗different‘ from the indigenous population.  Ross captured this point in 
his description of the rhetoric of poverty as both revealing and obscuring: on the one 
hand, a reality of criminal and immoral behaviour is revealed, but this simply 
demonstrates that: ―[t]he rich are not the only ones who defraud the government and 
abuse their children.‖;163 while, on the other hand, the rhetoric obscures those aspects 
of the lives of asylum seekers that mirror our own lives: that we all suffer when our 
access to a secure base for housing and home is rendered precarious.   
 
The rhetoric makes it easy for the legal methodology to simply accept the status quo 
and to say that we can‘t change the world.  In the case of asylum seekers‘ access to 
housing and home, viewing the issue through a lens which excludes the human 
context of experiences of lack of home or ‗un-homeliness‘ from the dominant 
discourse enables decisions to be reached in accordance with the overarching interests 
of the state, with the primary area of legal debate focusing around which is less 
responsible for the limited provision available, between local authorities and the 
centrally funded NASS.  This article problematises these issues by identifying an 
oppositional discourse which recognises the reality of asylum seekers‘ experiences of 
(the absence of) housing and home, so demonstrating the need to add an important 
human dimension to legal and policy discourses concerning access to support, forced 
destitution and the opportunity to establish ‗home‘.  We argue that this oppositional 
discourse should be brought to bear when addressing fundamental questions 
underpinning the balance struck between the state‘s interests in relation to asylum 
seekers and the individual right to seek refuge.   
 
Since policies are rooted in the recognition of problems, the first step in this process 
must be to re-define the exclusion of such people from housing and home as a 
                                                 
161
 R Sales, ‗The deserving and the undeserving?  Refugees, asylum seekers and welfare in Britain‘ 
(2002) 22 Critical Social Policy 456.   
162
 Above, nn 53-58 and associated text. 
163
 Ross, above n 157, 1541. 
25 | P a g e  
 
problem requiring a solution.
164
  If social problems are understood as a process of 
competitive claims-making,
165
 the oppositional discourse would seek to counter the 
official discourse which has to date been promulgated by the media and politicians 
and which has constructed the presence of asylum seekers as the problem, and 
excluded consideration of their needs for housing and home.
166
  Jacobs et al have 
identified three conditions which are necessary for housing problems to be recognised 
as problems and acted upon: (1) a convincing narrative must be developed; (2) a 
coalition of support must be constructed; and (3) the coalition of support must ensure 
that institutional measures are implemented.
167
  We would argue that the lens of 
housing and home provides a framework within which to develop a convincing 
narrative opposing the exclusion of asylum seekers - which we recognise as not just 
about the allocation of housing and welfare resource but giving effect to a political 
agenda regarding immigration and asylum policy which is preoccupied with 
control.
168
  By providing this alternative lens, we would seek to develop a coalition of 
support in favour of reconstructing the normative questions around the rights to 
housing and home for asylum seekers. 
 
An example of this approach in practice, and its power to influence institutional 
measures, can be seen in the amendments to the proposed Common European Asylum 
System put forward by the EU‘s Committee of the Regions,169 including the 
proposition that: ―Forced destitution, or the threat of it, shall never be used in order to 
coerce refused applicants to return to their state of origin.‖170  The emergence of an 
oppositional discourse provides opportunities to lobby for developments in the way 
that we understand the norms that underpin human rights, for example, the right to 
housing, to respect for home or even to freedom from inhuman and degrading 
treatment.  It is also important to remember that these: ―human rights norms can help 
inculcate political willingness to act responsibly in contentious areas such as the 
relationship between immigration and social housing.‖;171 and so potentially counter-
balance the official discourse in influencing legislative developments to move beyond 
minimal compliance with international standards, and to re-think the balance struck 
by policies that exclude asylum seekers from housing and home.   
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